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ety of issues of recent importance in New York law. Among the
cases considered is Moustakas v. Bouloukos in which the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held that an attorney of record may
not be dismissed unless the statutory procedures of CPLR 321 are
followed. In Moustakas the plaintiff had discharged his attorney
be means of a handwritten letter rather than in the manner prescribed by CPLR 321. In a memorandum opinion, the court
deemed such a dismissal ineffective and permitted a recission of
the settlement that was negotiated by the plaintiff per se.
In Brandon v. Chefetz, the Appellate Division, First Department, broadly construed Article 9 of the CPLR, holding that Article 9 could not be used to bar certification of plaintiff shareholders
with substantially similar claims in actions against corporate directors. The Brandon court advocated a broad construction of Article
9 to ensure that injured parties would not be precluded from advancing their claims.
In this issue, The Survey also examines People v. Lawrence, in
which the Court of Appeals refused to excuse a defendant's failure
to make a timely motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds even
though the failure to make such a motion resulted from the trial
judge's directive to defer the motion until after trial. The majority
held that CPL section 255.20(3), which grants discretionary authority to courts to consider pre-trial motions any time prior to
sentencing, does not apply to motions to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds. Therefore, the defendant's failure to comply with the
statutory procedures of CPL section 210.20(2) constituted a waiver
of defendant's right to request a dismissal on speedy trial grounds.
The dissent criticized the narrow construction of section 210.20(2)
by the majority, arguing that section 255.20(3) is applicable to all
pre-trial motions.
Finally, The Survey examines a recent clarification in the law
concerning eavesdropping warrants. In People v. Paluska, the Appellate Division, Third Department, considered sections of the
1958 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 13 .................................
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CPL that authorize the issuance of eavesdropping warrants for a
period of interception no longer than thirty days. Stressing the importance of strictly construing eavesdropping statutes, the court
held that the thirty days begins to run on the day the warrant is
issued unless the issuing court specifies another date of commencement in the warrant. The members of Volume 60 hope that the
cases considered in The Survey will be of help and interest to the
New York bench and bar.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES

CPLR 321: Remedy of rescission available to party who violates
statute by negotiating settlement pro se without effectively discharging an attorney of record
CPLR 3211 provides that a party to a civil action who appears2
by counsel is prohibited from acting for himself in the action except by permission of the court.3 Further, if a party wishes to apSee CPLR 321 (Supp. 1986). Section 321(a) of the CPLR provides:
(a) A party, other than one specified in section 1201, may prosecute or defend a
civil action in person or by attorney, except that a corporation... shall appear
by attorney, except as otherwise provided in section 1809 of the New York city
civil court act, the uniform district court act, the uniform city court act and the
uniform justice court act. If a party appears by attorney he may not act in person
in the action except by consent of the court.
Id.; WK&M T 321.01 (1985).
Courts generally have stated that the purpose of § 321 is to avoid confusion regarding
the identity of the individual who has authority to act in an ongoing litigation. See infra
note 28 and accompanying text.
Section 321(a) of the CPLR was adopted substantially unchanged from CPA 236. See
FOURTH REP. 190; FINAL REP. 281; SIXTH REP. 119; CPLR 321, commentary at 411 (1972).
Several older cases construing CPA 236 are treated in this survey to aid in an analysis of the
corresponding CPLR section.
2 See CPLR 320(a). A formal appearance is made when a party either "serve[s] an
answer or a notice of appearance," or "mak[es] a motion which has the effect of extending
the time to answer." Id.
3 See CPLR 321(a); H. WACHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 66-67 (5th
ed. 1976); accord Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 App. Div. 2d 15, 19, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 117
(2d Dep't 1978) (although party represented by counsel at trial may not act, he may help
plan trial strategy). Compare Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. O'Flynn, N.Y.L.J., June 22,
1984, at 12, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 21, 1984) (despite contention that such was
delay tactic, defendant who properly discharged his attorney could act on his own behalf)
with Cann v. Cann, 204 Misc. 1069, 1071, 127 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954)
(once defendant represented by counsel, counsel can be served on defendant's behalf).
The rule against pro se representation by a party represented by counsel predates the
codification of civil procedure in New York. See Webb v. Dill, 18 Abb. Pr. 264, 264 (Sup. Ct.
1st Dist. 1865). This principle is closely related to the premise permitting a party to retain
only one attorney of record in a particular action. Cf. Dobbins v. County of Erie, 58 App.

